Report published on sinking ‘The Gallant’

The French “Bureau d’enquête sur les événements de mer” has published a report on the sinking of De Gallant. At the editor’s request, sea captain and former EZS director Bernt Folmer summarised.

On 21-05-2024, the Gallant sank when she was west of Inagua Island, about 75 miles north of the passage between Cuba and Haiti. In the process, two crew members lost their lives. Last week, the investigation report by the French equivalent of the Maritime Investigation Board came online. In terms of content and style, this report was not written with the intention of using it in legal proceedings or to assign criminal responsibility, nor to assess individual or collective liability. The sole purpose of this report is to improve maritime safety by drawing lessons from it.

No judgment

Bernt Folmer is a tallship captain and has sailed all the oceans. For Dutch sailors, he finds the report reason to re-examine their own vulnerability: “I recognise all the moments in this story. Fortunately, things often go well. I think this accident should be a learning moment for ship owners, captains and first mates. Keep looking critically at what you are doing and don’t be too proud to talk about it with others. It has made a dire impression on me.”

Bernt stresses that his analysis does not imply judgement: “I was not there, I have neither seen nor spoken to any of the survivors. I only realise as a sailor – like hopefully everyone reading this – that I should always do everything I can to not let something like this happen again.”

The situation

On 19 May, De Gallant passed through the Windward Passage between Cuba and Haiti. From departure, the eastern trade wind had been weak and the engine had assisted for 10 hours. On the evening of 20 May, De Gallant sailed west of Great Inagua Island, under mainsail, schooner sail, staysail, jib and flying jib. As usual, the two topsails were lowered before nightfall. The wind was easterly at ten knots and the ship sailed at 70° to windward at less than two knots.

On the night of Monday to Tuesday 21 May, the schooner was close to a thunderstorm with strong winds. As a result of the wind, the ship tilted heavily to port twice, flooding the crew quarters and engine room. The decision to abandon ship was quickly made.

The crew and passengers barely had time to put on their survival suits before the ship sank over the stern. Everyone was pulled down with it by the suction. When they surfaced, the survivors managed to climb aboard one of the rafts, despite the sea conditions. They soon discovered that two sailors were missing.

Four points of interest

The report lists a number of determining factors in the accident. In the case of four, Bernt wrote a consideration:

• the weather
• watertight doors
• a small (not too experienced) crew
• too small scuppers (?)

Weather:

At 12:00 UTC on 20 May, the general situation was characterised by a 1007-hPa low pressure area east of the United States, which extended into a trough as far as Florida. In this trough, a cold front extended over Florida and the northern Bahamas. At 00.00 UTC on 21 May, there was also a light trough south of the Bahamas.
This kind of situation favours the formation of showers and thunderstorms.

On 21 May at 06.00 UTC, the situation showed the presence of a trough over northern Bahamas “cold” air. The presence of this cold air combined with warm water (27°C) is conducive to the formation of thunderstorms.

Infrared images around 05:00 UTC showed the formation of 2 separate cells, which merged around 07:00 UTC as they moved east-north-east. The resulting supercell reached its maximum around 07:30 – 08:00 UTC and then started to diminish after 08:30 UTC. As of 08.00 UTC, the Gallant was in the path of maximum supercell activity. Before this type of supercell, sharp drops in temperature and strong wind gusts could be observed. Interviews with survivors indicated a very marked temperature drop, with a feeling of cold after a day of overwhelming heat.
Also around 08:00 UTC, intense electrical activity was observed by satellite. At this time, the schooner was just before maximum activity.

The Gallant thus faced a tropical supercell whose position was unpredictable. The vessel arrived in the trajectory of the supercell exactly when it reached its maximum (the period in the life of a cell when the phenomena of wind gusts, lightning and precipitation are strongest).

Consideration:
“Despite countless good weather apps and websites, basic meteorological knowledge remains a much underrated factor of good seamanship. This weather was not predicted, the only indicators were thunderstorms and a very sudden drop in temperature.”

Watertight doors

When the ship first heeled over, seawater was pouring into the crew compartment. The crew had just come out of here and the watertight door had remained open. The captain decided to start the bilge pump to drain that section and reduce the risk of stability loss.

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To do this, he had to enter the engine room to start the generator. On entering, the captain left the door to the engine room open. When the ship heeled over for the second time, more seriously than the first time, seawater flowed through this opening into the engine room until it flooded completely. The captain was barely able to save himself from the flooded engine room. At this point, The Gallant no longer had enough spare buoyancy to stay afloat. The ship quickly sank over the stern.

Consideration:
“Who doesn’t recognize this? The weather is beautiful, the ship is warm from the sun, you have to go in and out of an interior space every time. How tempting then is it to leave the watertight doors open?
On the other hand: many ships have watertight doors in the gangway, sometimes on both sides of the ship. In all cases, it is advisable to close them consistently. The same applies to doors providing access from the middle deck, although water is much less likely to enter there under an incline. It cannot be emphasised enough that the watertight layout of the ship must be guaranteed in all circumstances.”

Crew

The crew consisted of a captain, a mate, two deckhands and four passengers. The captain had extensive experience. Although the mate had sailing experience, he was sailing on this ship for the first time and the two deckhands were still in a learning process. The passengers were not part of the crew.

At 02:00, the captain took over the watch with a sailor and two passengers. He resumed radar watch and set course north to avoid a dubious echo to the northwest. The wind had picked up slightly and the sea was still calm, but the temperature had dropped. Around 03.15 am, the first raindrops fell on the ship. The captain decided to lower the flying jib and mainsail and had the other watch wake up. Suddenly, around 03.20 am, the first strong gust of wind laid the boat flat on the water. The force of the wind made it impossible for the crew to lower the flying jib.

Consideration:
“So when assembling the crew and watches, the rigging has to be taken into account very carefully. If you have to, can you really reduce sail very quickly with the running watch? Both gaff topsails went down at night by default, very sensible with such a crew. The weather forecast at nightfall gave no reason for further sail reduction. But if you know that certain sails are difficult to come down with a lot of wind, then you should take them down earlier or sail with larger watches on deck.”

Scuppers

Several eyewitness accounts indicate that a large amount of seawater flowed over the bulwark under the influence of the heel. When the ship got back on its feet, the scuppers could not drain enough seawater, so the ship could not fully right itself.

Consideration:
“It seems a weighty point, but I find it debatable. On the one hand, it can be argued that these ships are equipped with this size of scuppers as standard, and that this is sufficient in practically all cases; on the other hand, in the case of a partially fulfilled ship, the size of the scuppers is not the main issue.”

“The report provides a number of conclusions and lessons. It talks about the time it took to put on the survival suits, that this would not have been practised enough. To me, at 27 degrees water temperature, that seems like a minor issue. The fact that the sails are operated traditionally is also put forward as a negative factor: a ship like this should be sailed with a larger crew. In my view, that comes back to the crew composition. It is a choice between pre-emptively reducing more sails at night or sailing with a larger (experienced) crew that can set and lower sails under all circumstances.”

“I, like many of us, hope never to experience something like this. My intense sympathy goes out to the rescued sailors and the bereaved families of the two missing crew members.”

The full version of the report can be downloaded here (from page 37 in English).

This article is the start of several articles on safety at sea. On the initiative of the BBZ and the EZS, a group of captains and mates will meet soon to discuss and learn from this incident, among others.

Text: Courtesy of Bernt Folmer.

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